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Abstract
In this paper we provide a simple model examining the choice between
enforceable and non-enforceable contracts when, on the one hand, drafting
an enforceable contract is costly and, on the other hand, fullling a non-
enforceable contract is left to partiesfairness. According to the previous
literature we nd that (1) the choice between the two contract settings in
equilibrium depends on fairness and enfocement costs, and (2) whenever
a non-enforceable contract is chosen in equilibrium it turns out welfare-
improving. However, we are able to measure e¢ ciency and make punctual
predictions of how distant the decentralized solution is from rst-best.
Precisely, we nd that e¢ ciency is strongly conditioned by the stake of the
transaction, so that both contracts allow for very high levels of e¢ cency in
the presence of low-stake transactions, whereas e¢ ciency always collapses
to very low levels for high-stake transactions. It implies that a social
planner should intervene only in the last case, even in the presence of
high levels of fairness. Our results are robust and hold in a repeated
game, proving that reputation is not welfare improving unless the number
of interactions exceeds a given threshold.
1 Introduction
As it is usually found written in contract law textbooks, if parties are gentlemen
then contracts could be simply nalized by handshake. However, according to
a well known saying recalled by Grosheide (2004: 41) honor does not belong
to the province of civil law, so that other legal devices have been introduced
in order to solve the crucial problem of contract enforcement.
Although honor does not belong either to the province of the traditional
economic theory, the theoretical and experimental investigations carried out
by several inuential economists during the last decades drew attention to the
role of emotional and reciprocal behavior as important driving forces that may
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lead agents to deal with contract complexity in a di¤erent fashion than mere
self-oriented behavior.1 This is in particular the case of fairness. On the one
hand, fairness may work as a strong contract enforcement device giving rise
to or expanding some markets that otherwise would be severely constrained.2
On the other hand, by allowing the introduction of Pareto-superior contracts
in the form of incomplete contracts, fairness reduces the negative e¤ects of the
uncooperative outcome (e.g., prisonersdilemma) and improves overall welfare.3
These investigations are giving rise to an emerging behavioral contract theory
attempting to improve the predictive power and, at times, to change the nor-
mative conclusions of traditional contract theory.4
We move from this literature claiming that further advancements in behav-
ioral contract theory can be obtained if the focus on fairness includes some other
important elements that inuence the benecial e¤ects of fairness in trading and
partieswelfare. Precisely, we agree that under certain circumstances fairness
serves as a contract enforcement device and improves social welfare, however we
claim that its welfare enhancing features depend on the value at stake in the
trade between parties.
The experimental literature shows that the magnitude of partiesrevenues
does not change peoples behavior, that is high stakes do not induce to be-
have selshly, bringing about the prediction that nal outcomes should not be
a¤ected.5 Our results encompass these ndings in the sense that the value of
transaction does not a¤ect the nal choice upon which contract should be imple-
mented. Nevertheless, in our ndings the value of transaction is crucial in terms
of partieswelfare and e¢ ciency of the nal equilibrium also in the presence of
fairness: petty transactions are characterized by high e¢ ciency levels and the
role of fairness appears marginal, whereas important transactions - stemming
from value-enhancing technologies - may show very low levels of e¢ ciency, which
can be improved only by means of a fair and trustworthy contractual environ-
ment.
Our results are robust and hold both in one shot-games and in nitely re-
peated games. About the latter case, e¢ ciency loss can be resolved by allowing
parties to trade repeatedly so as to acquire reputation,6 which should induce
parties to behave fairly especially in the presence of important transactions.
This observation is partially correct, it depends on the levels of fairness trigger-
ing informal agreements and on the numerosity of interactions. We are able to
measure i) in which circumstances informal agreements could give rise to some
1Just to cite a few authors, see Akerlof 1982; Geanakoplos et al. 1989; Rabin 1993; Fehr
et al. 1997.
2See Fehr et al. (1997).
3See Fehr et al. (1997), Fehr et al. (2007).
4For an extensive overview on the topic, see Fehr and Schmidt (2002).
5High monetary revenues do not a¤ect the nal outcome in games like the ultimatum game
(Ho¤man et al. 1996; Slonim and Roth 1998; Cameron 1999) or the gift exchange game (Fehr
et al. 2002).
6Fehr and Schmidt (2004) argue that informal agreements based on fairness are much easier
to sustain if the game is repeated. Sobel (2005), and Fehr and Gintis (2007) share the same
result.
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reputational e¤ects, and ii) how much strategic reputation can be truly e¤ective
as a substitute for increasing levels of fairness when high stakes come into play.
To achieve these results we propose a principal-agent model involving both
fair and selsh individuals trading into a competitive market and choosing be-
tween a non-enforceable contract, which is fully incomplete, representing a hand-
shake agreement, and an enforceable contract, which is costly to draft but veri-
able by an impartial court of law. Since the beginning, we need to clarify that we
are not interested in the driving forces inducing individuals to behave fairly as
other investigations do when introducing di¤erent motivations to fairness.7 We
simply assume that fair individuals precommit to behave fairly, meaning that
breaking a promise is not considered a feasible strategy even if the contract
is non-enforceable. On the contrary, selsh individuals act without precom-
mitment, and strategically decide whether to full or break a given promise
according to their self-regarding preferences.
As in Fehr et al. (2007) our model conrms that non-enforceable contracts
are preferred in equilibrium as the proportion of fair individuals increases and/or
the cost of drafting an enforceable contract decreases. The model also con-
rms that the outcome in equilibrium assures higher levels of welfare when the
contract chosen is non-enforceable. However, as mentioned above, even if non-
enforceable contracts are welfare-improving, the e¢ ciency levels are seriously
undermined by increasing returns to scale, unless fairness is considerably wide-
spread and reputational e¤ects can e¤ectively play a role through a large number
of interactions.
To our knowledge, this is the rst attempt to make some accurate predictions
about the e¢ ciency levels in contract theory through analytical and graphical
simulations.8 Not only are we able to measure the e¢ ciency of the two contracts
separately but we are also able to measure the e¢ ciency of playerschoice in
one-shot and repeated games in percentage of the rst-best equilibrium. This
further contribution to the existing literature gives rise to quantitative predic-
tions and normative results. In particular, we can assess in which circumstances
the decentralized choice is goodor alternatively the policy maker can inter-
vene by orienting individualschoices.
The paper is organized as follows. Next section provides the general speci-
cation of the model. In sections 3 and 4 we present results respectively for the
one-shot game and the repeated game. A welfare comparison between the social
optimum and the decentralized solution is the topic of section 5. In this sec-
tion, we will be able to accurately distinguish in which circumstances and how
much the introduction of fair-minded players is benecial to the society. Finally,
section 6 summarizes the main results achieved and concludes the paper.
7Two main theoretical strands attempted to model fairness: the intention-based fairness
models or reciprocal fairness models (Rabin 1993; Levine 1998; Charness and Rabin 2002;
Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger 2004; Falk and Fischbacher 2006) and the inequity aversion
models (Fehr and Schmidt 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels 2000).
8The adoption of mathematical software (Mathematica 8.0) allow for the composition of
often-complicated solutions of optimization problems, which could not have otherwise been
interpreted.
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2 The Model
A risk-neutral principal (she) asks a risk-neutral agent (he) to provide a service
produced in a competitive market that requires a positive e¤ort level (e) in ex-
change of a price (p). The principal can choose between two di¤erent contracts:
one is not enforceable (NE) in front of a court of law, and for this reason it
can be considered a sort of handshake or gentlemens agreement, the other is
enforceable (E) but also costly to draft and to enforce. Whichever contract is
proposed, the agent decides whether to accept or reject the principals o¤er. If
the agent rejects, the game ends; if the agent accepts, he will provide the service
and asks for a price. The principal is assumed to observe the agents e¤ort level
at no cost and pays the price if the contract is enforceable, whereas she has the
option to renege on the promise if the contract is not enforceable.9 Then, the
game ends. We now describe the game in detail.
Players
Players are randomly drawn from a population of individuals who can be
either (S)elsh or (F )air. S only cares about her monetary utility whereas
F precommits to full the contract even if non-enforceable by third parties.
Individuals type is private information, although the probability  2 (0; 1) that
an individual is F is common knowledge. As mentioned in the introduction, we
are not interested in the reasons why individuals may decide to behave fairly,
so that we do not incorporate fairness into the utility functions. Additionally
our approach to fairness draws on the notion of one-sided reciprocity, such as
only one player (the principal) can respond reciprocally to a given action of the
other player (the agent).10 Indeed, the principal is the last player and can verify
the agents e¤ort at no cost, thus no hidden shirking is allowed. Consequently,
as it stands, the distinction between fair and selsh agents is irrelevant.
Contracts
The principal decides which contract to propose to the agent. If she o¤ers
NE, she makes a promise in terms of a price pNE to be paid to the agent in
exchange of a specic e¤ort eNE . If the agent accepts the agreement, he delivers
an e¤ort level ~e and waits for the principal to return the promised price. In this
sense, the agent appeals to the fairness of the principal to recompense the placed
trust. The principal observes ~e at no cost and decides whether to full or break
the promise according to her type: F will always full the promise if ~e = eNE ,
9The perfect observability of e¤ort can also be found in Gächter and Falk (2002) and Fehr
and Schmidt (2007). When e¤ort is not perfectly observable as in MacLeod and Malcomson
(1989) the principal can solicit agents fairness to provide high e¤ort levels through gener-
ous bonuses. The assumption of perfect observability of the agents e¤ort shifts the trust
requirements to the principal. The agent has to decide whether the principal deserves trust
or not.
10This one-way reciprocity has been experimentally investigated in Fehr et al. (1997)
with the weak reciprocity treatment. On the contrary, the implicit contract in Fehr et al.
(2007), so called bonus contract, is a two-sided reciprocity framework by giving the agent
the freedom to choose the e¤ort level and, if satisfactory, the principal may reciprocate.
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whereas S will always break it. If the principal observes ~e 6= eNE , she will not
pay the agent, independently of her type.11 Such an assumption can be justied
using the Roman words inademplendi non est ademplendum, meaning that
in case of missed or wrong contractual performance one party cannot ask the
other to satisfy any contractual duties.
If the principal o¤ers E, she is bound to pay a price pE in exchange of a given
e¤ort eE , and pays a fee or transaction cost to be calculated as a fraction of the
price, cpE with c 2 (0; 1), covering the cost of writing the contract and making
it fully enforceable.12 The value of c is common knowledge. If the agent accepts
the contract and delivers the required e¤ort (i.e., ~e = eE), he can enforce the
payment of pE . Thus, breaking the promise is sanctioned by the contract itself
implying no di¤erence between principals types.13
Payo¤s
Principals revenue from the agents performance is described by the pro-
duction function y(e) = e where  is exogenous and measures the returns to
scale. Technology is allowed to show di¤erent returns to scale: decreasing re-
turns to scale (0 <  < 1), constant returns to scale ( = 1), and increasing
returns to scale (1 <  < 2).14 The level of  is common knowledge. We as-
sume that (A)gents cost of providing e¤ort e follows a standard cost function
k(e) = 12e
2.15
In a non-enforceable contract the utility functions are the following:
UNEP = y(e)  pNE principals utility from fullling NE
UNEP = y(e) principals utility from reneging on NE
UNEA = (p
NE   k(e)) + (1  )( k(e)) agents expected utility from NE.
In an enforceable contract the utility functions are the following:
UEP = y(e)  (1 + c)pE principals utility from E
UEA = p
E   k(e) agents utility from E.
11An important di¤erence with the non-enforceable contract designed in the experimental
investigation of Fehr et al. (2007) is that in our model the agent does not obtain any additional
reward beyond the promised price in the handshake agreement, whereas in their model the
agent calls for a generous voluntary bonus by eliciting an e¤ort level higher than that required
by the principal. This observation highlights the di¤erence between the notion of fairness in
Fehr et al. (2007), which derives from inequity aversion considerations, whereas in our context
might be more related to abiding social norms or simply bilateral informal agreements.
12This is a plausible assumption. For instance, lawyers fee or litigation costs usually depend
on the contract value; in our case the price. We might have used di¤erent enforcement cost
functions such as costs with xed and variable parts, however because of the subjectivity in
the simulations of the magnitude of the xed part we discarded these functions.
13Again, in Fehr et al. (2007) the so called incentive contract shows some similarities
with our enforceable contract.
14  2 would cause negative or innite utility to principals.
15For similar specication of the cost of e¤ort function see among many Milgrom and
Roberts (1992), Schaefer (1998), and Azar (2007).
5
To sum up, the game consists of three stages. In stage 1, the principal
observes her own type, and decides whether to o¤er an enforceable or a non-
enforceable contract to the agent according to the levels of , , and c. Conse-
quently, she sets the price, depending on the type of contract chosen, and asks
for a specic e¤ort level. In stage 2, the agent decides whether to accept or
reject the o¤er. If the agent rejects the o¤er the game ends and both players
get zero, otherwise the agent provides the e¤ort and expects the payment. In
stage 3, if the contract is enforceable, the principal pays pE ; if the contract is
not enforceable, the principal chooses to pay or not to pay pNE according to
her own type.
Players match randomly and interact only once in a one-shot game. Further
on, this hypothesis will be relaxed allowing for repeated interactions. We solve
both games searching for perfect Bayesian equilibria.
Lemma 1 Rejecting the principals o¤er (~e = 0) strictly dominates delivering
an e¤ort level ~e 6= eE ; eNE	.
Proof. The proof follows straightforward from the assumption that the princi-
pal can observe ~e at no cost. Thus, A should not provide an e¤ort level lower
than either eNE in a non-enforceable contract or eE in an enforceable contract.
This would imply an infringement of the contract with the consequence that the
principal will never pay the price, regardless of her type and the type of contract
proposed. Further, supplying ~e >

eE ; eNE
	
would not entail an additional re-
ward thereby implying only an increase in the cost of e¤ort. As a result, the
best strategies for A are either rejecting the contract or providing the requested
e¤ort.
3 One-Shot Game
Proposition 1 No separating equilibrium can exist for both types of principal
o¤ering di¤erent contracts or non-enforceable contracts with di¤erent levels of
e¤ort and/or price.
Proof. Suppose there exists a separating equilibrium such that F o¤ers a
non-enforceable contract and S o¤ers an enforceable contract. The following
condition should apply:
UNEP > U
E
P > U
NE
P (1)
Condition (1) implies y(eNE)   p(eNE) > y(eNE), which is unfeasible because
p(eNE) > 0. Thus, since condition (1) is not satised, this equilibrium does not
exist because S would protably deviate from E by proposing NE, and eventu-
ally reneging on the contract once received As e¤ort. Suppose now there exists
a separating equilibrium such that F o¤ers an enforceable contract and S o¤ers
a non-enforceable contract. A knows that S never fulls the promise, so that
he will always reject any o¤er of a non-enforceable contract coming only from
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selsh principals. Thus, this equilibrium does not exist and S would protably
o¤er an enforceable contract. The same reasoning excludes any equilibrium
for the two types of principal o¤ering a non-enforceable contract with di¤erent
levels of price and/or e¤ort.
Proposition 1 therefore implies that S is necessarily induced to mimic F .
Proposition 2 In a one-shot game there exists an equilibrium in which the
principal o¤ers an enforceable contract, which the agent accepts. This is a
unique equilibrium if    = 11+c , whereas if  >  there also exists a class
of equilibria in which both F and S o¤er a non-enforceable contract, which the
agent accepts.
Proof. Suppose that both types of principal o¤er an enforceable contract. It is
always an equilibrium because no principal has an interest to deviate to o¤ering
a non-enforceable contract because A would consider such a deviation coming
from S due to the adverse inference, and therefore would reject it. Therefore, A
will accept an enforceable contract for any e and p satisfying his participation
constraint, which for simplicity holds with a reservation utility equal to 0, that
is
p  1
2
e2. (1)
The free-entry condition implies that condition (1) holds as an equality. Substi-
tuting (1) into the principals utility function, UEP , and maximizing with respect
to e, we obtain eE and pE , such that
eE =


1 + c
 1
2 
pE =
1
2


1 + c
 2
2 
.
Both eE and pNE are increasing in  and decreasing in c. Any principal o¤ering
an enforceable contract will therefore obtain
UEP =


1 + c
 
2 

1  
2

.
No principal can protably deviate to any other enforceable contract because
she would get a lower payo¤. Note that 8c 2 (0; 1) and 8 2 (0; 2), UEP > 0.
UEP is always decreasing in c, whereas it is increasing in  only if   (c), with
(c) > 1.
Suppose that both types of principal o¤er a non-enforceable contract. As
expected utility will be
UNEA = 

p  1
2
e2

+ (1  )

 1
2
e2

.
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Thus, A will accept the o¤er if and only if
p  1
2
e2. (2)
Because of the free-entry condition we will limit our analysis to the equilibria
in which the agent gets 0. If such a class of equilibria exist, F and S get
respectively e   12e2 and e . Since 12e2 > 0 if F has no incentive to deviate
to an enforceable contract, then it must be true also for S. We can therefore
exclude that such a deviation is protable if
UNEP = e
   1
2
e2 >


1 + c
 
2 

1  
2

, (3)
where the right-hand side corresponds to the maximum payo¤ a principal can
get from an enforceable contract. Any couple (p(e); e) satisfying condition (3)
is an equilibrium in this class, and no principal can protably deviate to any
other non-enforceable contract since the agent infers that this deviation would
come from S. In order to prove that this class of equilibria is non-empty, we
now maximize UNEP with respect to e. We obtain
eNE = ()
1
2 
pNE =
1
2


2  
2
2  .
Note that both eNE and pNE are always increasing at an increasing rate in ,
and if   1=2, also in .16 F will get
UNEP = ()

2 

1  
2

, (4)
which is always increasing in ; and in  if   1=2 and   (), with () > 1.
Note that 8 2 (0; 1) and 8 2 (0; 2), UNEP > 0. Proposition 1 implies that S
cannot o¤er any other non-enforceable contract because A would infer her type
and reject the proposal. Thus, S will get
UNEP = ()

2  > UNEP .
Substituting (4) into condition (3) we nd that this class of equilibria is non-
empty if and only if  > 11+c = .
As shown in this proof, the model is characterized by multiple equilibria if
the proportion of fair principals is high enough to sustain also a class of non-
enforceable equilibria. Renements such as the intuitive criterion or divinity
16This result is experimentally corroborated by Englmaier and Leider (2010), who nd that
the agent is more willing to reciprocate as the magnitude of the benet to the principal from
his e¤ort increases.
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do not apply. Nevertheless, multiplicity does not a¤ect the results presented in
section 5 on the welfare analysis.
Not surprisingly, the results predict that a non-enforceable contract may
arise in equilibrium as the probability that the principal is fair increases and/or
the enforcement costs increase.17 What is less obvious is why the coe¢ cient
, measuring the returns to scale, does not play any role for the existence of
equilibria in NE. As it can be noticed by comparing UNEP and U
E
P the impact
of  is identical in both contracts, meaning that technology is neutral with
respect to the type of contract proposed. Besides, returns to scale are not
relevant for the agent while deciding whether to accept or reject a given o¤er as
they do not a¤ect his participation constraint.18 This result is consistent with
the experimental literature, showing that large increases in partiesrevenues do
not a¤ect partiesbehavior and their attitude to fairness.19 If the principal is
assumed to be fair and to full a promise, not only does the value of transaction
not a¤ect her commitment but also her contract choice.
Lemma 2 F cannot send a credible signal to the agent about her true type.
Proof. Consider F o¤ering a non-enforceable contract and deciding to pay
a rst installment pNE with  2 (0; 1) before the agent supplies the e¤ort
required so that to discourage S to propose a non-enforceable contract, thereby
signalling her fair type. With this form of signalling nothing would change
for F , who eventually pays the price promised. Conversely, S would lose the
rst installment if she wants to signal to be an F type. Therefore, the signal is
credible if it is su¢ ciently high to discourage S from proposing a non-enforceable
contract in equilibrium and paying the rst installment. However, no credible
signal can be sent because S has always an interest to mimic F by sending
distorted signals about her true type. Indeed, in order to make the signal
working the following condition must hold
y(eNE)  pNE > y(eE)  (1 + c)pE > y(eNE)  pNE . (5)
However, this condition will never hold 8  < 1.20
17Similar results can be found in Berg et al. 1995, Fehr et al. 1997, Fehr and Schmidt 2002.
18For example, the results predict that a customer calling an electrician in order to substitute
a broken electrical cable, which costs to the electrician a given e¤ort level, will o¤er the same
type of contract if the service allows for either replacing a plug or the entire electrical house
system. On the contrary, which contract will be implemented depends crucially on the costs of
drafting and making the contract enforceable, and the level of trust placed by the electrician
to be eventually paid.
19This has been tested in the ultimatum games (Cameron 1999) and in the gift-exchange
games (Fehr et al. 2002).
20For simplicity we have assumed that agents are all F type. However, this assumption
does not change the ine¤ectiveness of signalling. If agents were also of two types, the utility
functions of the principals would become UNEP = y(e
NE)   pNE   (1   )pNE and
UNEP = y(e
NE)   pNE , with still UNEP > UNEP 8 < 1. Besides, note that if  = 1,
condition (5) still does not hold, however the non-fullment risk shifts completely towards the
principals but the results of Proposition (1) still hold.
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4 Repeated game
Suppose the game is played repeatedly for a nite number of periods T , whose
value is common knowledge. The discount factor is assumed to be equal to 1.
In each period the principal decides which contract to propose to the agent,
either enforceable or non-enforceable. Matching is random, meaning that any
principal can match with any agent in each period. All players have perfect
knowledge of other playersbehavior in previous interactions; this means that if
a principal breaks a promise of payment in a non-enforceable contract, any agent
will refuse a non-enforceable contract from that principal thereafter because he
has inferred her selsh type.21
Given the multiplicity of equilibria with non-enforceable contracts character-
izing the one-shot game, within this class we will refer to the equilibrium in which
the principal maximizes her payo¤. Accordingly, we will assume that whenever
NE is chosen in equilibrium in some periods, it corresponds to the equilibrium in
which the agent gets 0, and a principal gets either ()

2 

1  2

or ()

2 
respectively from either honouring or breaking the contract.
Since the game is repeated, S may have an interest to acquire strategic
reputation for future transactions by proposing and fullling a non-enforceable
contract. If this incentive exists, the agent would trust all principals who pro-
pose a non-enforceable contract. This would give rise to a rst-best contract
(FB), in which no asymmetric information or enforcement costs would occur.
Thus, FB corresponds to either a non-enforceable contract with  = 1 or an
enforceable contract with c = 0. Accordingly, a principal proposing FB gets
UFBP = 

2 

1  2

from fullling, and UFBP = 

2  from reneging on the
promise. If both types of principal full FB, the agents expected utility would
be 0, otherwise it would be negative. This means that the agent would accept
FB along the equilibrium path in repeated games only if S has no incentive to
break the promise.
Lemma 3 a) UFBP > max

UEP ; U
NE
P
	
.
b) UFBP > U
FB
P and U
NE
P > U
NE
P .
c) S always breaks any promise in the last period T .
d) If E is chosen in equilibrium in periods (t+ 1; :::; T ), S always breaks any
promise in period t.
Proof. Proofs of parts a) and b) are trivial. Proof of part c) follows straight-
forward from the denition of selshness. The last period corresponds to a
one-shot game since there is no longer reputation to be acquired, so that S is
always induced to break a nonenforceable contract. Similarly, S has no inter-
est to acquire reputation at time t if an enforceable contract will be applied
thereafter, this proving part d).
21The same results would hold assuming that the principal always matches with the same
agent over time.
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It is worthwhile noting that Lemma 3c implies that no equilibrium in which
FB applies in period T can exist. Additionally, Lemma 3d implies that no
equilibrium in which FB can apply in period (1; :::; t) and E thereafter exists.
Proposition 3 In a repeated game,
a. There is an equilibrium in which E applies in each period, and it is unique
if   .
b. If  >  =
"

2+(T 1)( 11+c )

2  (1  2 )
(T 2)(1  2 )+1
# 2 

, there also exists a class of
(T   1) equilibria in which FB applies in periods (1; :::; t) with t  T   1, and
NE thereafter, which S always honors except in period T .
c. If  <   , there also exists an equilibrium in which NE applies in
each period, which S always honors except in period T .
Proof. We will recall throughout the proof the following conditions: i) agents
would punish any deviation by rejecting any contract but E thereafter, ii)
UFBP > U
E
P due to Lemma 3a, iii) U
NE
P > U
E
P if  > , and iv) U
NE
P  UEP if
  .
a. Suppose there exists an equilibrium in which both types of principals
o¤er E in each period such that e = eE and p = pE . The analysis of the
one-shot game implies that no principal can protably deviate to NE or FB in
any period because A infers that it would come from S. At the same time, any
other deviation to any enforceable contract o¤ering e 6= eE and/or p 6= pE is
not maximizing for the principals, thus the above equilibrium exists. Condition
iv) implies that F would prefer E to NE in any period. Thus, any NE will
be refused by the agent because it would come from S. Consequently, Lemma
3c and 3d exclude that FB can apply in any period. Therefore, if    the
equilibrium in enforceable contracts in each period is unique.
b. Consider the following equilibrium: FB in periods (1; :::; t) and NE in
periods (t + 1; :::; T ). By applying the backward induction, consider the last
period. Condition iii) implies that no principal has an interest to deviate to E
if  > , and As adverse inference excludes that any principal can protably
deviate to FB. In any other t > t, any deviation from NE to FB would not be
accepted by A because of the adverse inference, and conditions i) and iii) imply
that no S has an interest to deviate to reneging NE and necessarily applying
E from t+1 onwards. In t Lemma 3a implies that no principal has interest to
deviate to E or NE. Further, S has no interest to break FB if and only if
tUFBP + (T   t   1)UNEP + UNEP > (t   1)UFBP + UFBP + (T   t)UEP , (6)
that is
 >
2664

2 + (T   t)

1
1+c
 
2 

1  2

(T   t   1)

1  2

+ 1
3775
2 

. (7)
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Besides, conditions i) and iii) imply that if S has no interest to break FB
in period t, she has neither interest to break FB in any t < t. Thus, the
equilibrium in which FB applies in periods (1; :::; t) and NE in periods (t +
1; :::; T ) exists. The right-hand side of condition (7) is increasing in t, and
substituting for t = 1 it follows that there exists a class of (T   1) equilibria as
 > , with  monotone and increasing in t, and each equilibrium of this class
corresponds to di¤erent sub-intervals of  > , which do not intersect with each
other.22
c. If  <    then there does not exist any t satisfying condition (6),
thus no FB can be applied. Condition iii) implies that no principal has interest
to break NE apart from S in period T and to deviate to proposing E in any
period. Consequently the equilibrium in which NE applies in each period exists.
Although we have used the prot maximizing equilibrium in NE, we nd
that multiplicity a¤ects also repeated games, as highlighted by Fudenberg and
Masking (1986). Nevertheless, our results allow to sketch some general consider-
ations about the e¤ect of reputation on partiesbehavior and welfare. Precisely,
we are interested in verifying how t changes in , , c, and T . In other words,
we are interested in verifying how changes in the variables a¤ect the number of
FB. Solving condition (7) for t, we nd that:
t < T   
2  
1   2 


2   

1
1+c
 
2 
.
The rst partial derivative of the right-hand side in the above inequality, within
the interval of denition  > , is positive in  and c, and negative in . Further,
as ! 1, t tends to its maximum, that is T 1. As expected, an increase in the
overall level of fairness yields a higher number of FB, but also an increase in c
imposes individuals to invest more in trust since enforceable contracts becomes
more expensive. On the contrary, as  increases the incentive for S to break
FB gets higher due to the increasing gains from reneging. As to the number
of interactions T , its increase implies a higher t, which as it stands is not very
informative. However, it is easy to show that t
(T )
T increases with T , thereby
implying that as T increases the number of FB increases more than NE for
a given triple (; ; c). Thus, as expected and suggested by some inuential
literature (Brown et al. 2004; Gächter and Falk 2002), the more numerous the
transactions the more reputation in rst-best will be acquired.
We discuss now some implications.
First, neither T nor  inuence the existence of equilibria with non-enforceable
contracts with respect to the unique equilibrium in which enforceable contracts
are applied. In particular, this means that reputation does not help to infor-
malize contracts, even for negligible transactions.
22Trivially, if the game is played innitely and the discount factor is equal to 1, FB applying
in each period will be an equilibrium.
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Second, 8 < 1=2 and 8c 2 (0; 1) the equilibrium in repeated games is E in
each period as in the one-shot game; this shows how reputation is not enough
to ll the lack of trust generated by low levels of . In other words, there is a
threshold level of  below which reputation cannot induce the adoption of non-
enforceable contracts. In our model this threshold requires at least the majority
of players to be fair, and however it depends on the enforcement costs existing
in the legal system. Thus, even with repeated interactions, fairness should be
reasonably widespread to make informal agreements work.
Third, note that @@ > 0. This result shows that for given levels of c and
T , the higher  the more widespread fairness should be so as to implement FB
and thus e¢ cient contracts. Vice versa, if  is rather small, relatively low levels
of  allow for the introduction of FB. This result corroborates what found
in terms of t: ceteris paribus as returns to scale increase, that is transactions
become more valuable, the number of FB in equilibrium diminish, and only an
increase in the levels of fairness can counteract this e¤ect; the contrary occurs
for lower returns to scale. The reason of this nding is straightforward. Since
lim!0(UFBP  UFBP ) = 0, S is not induced to break FB because the gains from
reneging gets very low for  ! 0, thus fairness does not play an important role
and can also be rather limited, although it must be su¢ cient to sustain informal
agreements. On the contrary, lim!2(UFBP  UFBP ) =1, namely the principals
return from breaking FB gets exponentially high as  ! 2 such that acquiring
reputation in rst-best may not be as protable. In the latter case fairness is
crucial to contrast the incentive for S to deviate. In other words, high-value
transactions (i.e., high ) make reputation less e¤ective in implementing FB.
This can only be contrasted by fairness. At a rst glance, it seems rather intu-
itive thinking about the importance of reputation for high-valued transactions,
in which the high-stake should induce any player to behave strategically fair,
and consequently making the levels of fairness in the society less crucial. On
the contrary, this nding claims the opposite, that is the gains from breaking
FB (i.e., UFBP  UFBP ) become very high with high-value transactions and may
exceed the gains from reputation in rst-best (i.e. UFBP  UNEP ).23 As a result,
high-value transactions require high levels of fairness to keep production levels
high and to avoid a fall in welfare levels.
Fourth, fullling NE by both types of principals enables the agent to raise a
positive payo¤equal to (T t 1)pNE(1 ). As a consequence, the agent earns
more as t decreases and his expected utility is at its maximum in the equilibrium
with all NE. When information on individualstype is rather uncertain, that
is when  is neither close to 0, in which only E can be implemented, nor to
1, in which all FB are implemented apart from the last period, the benets
of reputation in second-best acquired by S is partly diverted to the agents.
Therefore, with intermediate levels of fairness the less informed party receives a
benet from uncertainty, which is totally paid by the more informed party who
needs to acquire reputation.
23A fortiori as the discount factor is less than one.
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5 Welfare Analysis
In this section we provide a comparison between the private solution arising from
a decentralized choice, such as described in the previous sections, and the public
solution in which production is centralized and all players follow the instructions
of a central planner. We rst present some features which are common to both
the one-shot game and the repeated games and then we focus on each game
type.
The optimal public solution identies the rst-best social surplus since no
enforcement cost and no asymmetric information occur, and provides a bench-
mark to assess the e¢ ciency of a decentralized solution in equilibrium where, on
the one hand, enforceable contracts su¤er from enforcement costs and, on the
other hand, non-enforceable contracts introduce asymmetric information over
principals types. In particular, we will be able to measure how distant the
social surplus achievable under a decentralized solution is from rst-best.
Call W the welfare function identifying the social surplus. It is easy to show
that the rst-best social surplus is:24
WFB = 

2 

2  
2

The welfare functions for E and NE yield respectively the following social
surpluses:25
WE =


1+c
 
2 

2 
2

and WNE = ()

2 

2 
2

,
where WNE is calculated for the equilibrium in which the principal maxi-
mizes her prots. This implies that WNE is the higher social welfare achievable
in a non-enforceable equilibrium.
As said in the previous section, a rst-best contract corresponds to either
E with c = 0, or NE with  = 1. In the following, WE and WNE will be
compared in percentage terms with WFB , as mentioned the latter being the
maximum achievable social surplus for any given . The comparison will be
evaluated over the space  c =]0; 1[]0; 2[]0; 1[. Of course, the e¢ ciency
levels () crucially depend on the values of  and  for NE and on the values
of c and  for E, as shown in Figure 1.
24The result follows from maxe

e   1
2
e2
	
.
25Note that these functions do not refer to the private choice between E and NE in equilib-
rium, but simply want to capture the e¢ ciency of the two contract settings taken separately.
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a. E b. NE
Figure 1. E¢ ciency levels of enforceable and non-enforceable contracts taken separately.
We nd that the overall e¢ ciency level of each contract, calculated for the
entire domain of planes (c; ) and (; ) respectively for E and NE are
E =
1Z
c=0
2Z
=0
WE
WFB
 100 = 61:50% and NE =
1Z
=0
2Z
=0
WNE
WFB
 100 = 61:37%
These values mean that both contracts waste on average slightly less than
40% of surplus with respect to a putative FB equilibrium. Graphically, the
overall e¢ ciency levels correspond to the volumes of the surfaces in the cuboids
of Figure 1. This result allows to draw the observation that in absolute and very
general terms the two contract settings are very similar in terms of e¢ ciency.
In order to address into more detail the reasons of such an outcome we need
to analyze the role of the three variables under scrutiny: , , and c. To do
so we start by computing E and NE respectively for given levels of c and 
in the entire interval of . Figure 2 below presents the e¢ ciency levels of WE
conditioned for c = f0:1; 0:5; 0:9g, measured by the sections of the surface in
Figure 1a. The analytical expression is the following
Ejc =
2Z
=0
WE
WFB
 100.
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a. c = 0:1 b. c = 0:5 c. c = 0:9
Figure 2. E¢ ciency levels of an enforceable contract for given enforcement costs.
Similarly, Figure 3 below shows the e¢ ciency levels of WNE conditioned
for  = f0:1; 0:5; 0:9g, measured by sections of the surface in Figure 1b. The
analytical expression is the following
NEj =
2Z
=0
WNE
WFB
 100.
a.  = 0:1 b.  = 0:5 c.  = 0:9
Figure 3. E¢ ciency levels of a non-enforceable contract for given levels of fairness.
Comparing Figures 2 and 3, we see that, independently on the values of 
and c, the loss in e¢ ciency increases in , but is compensated by the positive
impact of low levels of c or high levels of , depending on the contract we
consider. The visual impression of the above gures can be translated into
numerical terms in the following tables, which present Ejc and NEj.
E
c Ejc
0:1 80.4
0:5 57.8
0:9 49.0
NE
 NEj
0:1 31.7
0:5 61.6
0:9 91.0
Table 1. E¢ ciency Levels (%) of E and NE conditioned for specic values of  and c in the entire range of .
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It is worthwhile noting from Table 1 thatEj >Ejc for equal variations
in  and c. For a more complete analysis of the e¢ ciency levels of the two
contracts taken separately we now assume specic values for , representing
di¤erent returns to scale, as described in Table 2.
enforceable contracts

0:1 1:0 1:9
0:1 99.50 90.90 16.35
c 0:5 97.89 66.67 0.05
0:9 96.68 52.63 0.001
non-enforceable contracts

0:1 1:0 1:9
0:1 92.78 19.00 0
 0:5 98.95 75.00 0.002
0:9 99.97 99.00 39.17
Table 2. Punctual e¢ ciency levels (%) of E and NE.
What we expect from Table 2 is that E and NE yield very high (low)
 if respectively c tends to 0 (1) and  tends to 1 (0), as shown in Table
1. However, the outcome crucially depends on  in both contract settings.
Precisely, decreasing returns to scale allow for high levels of e¢ ciency even in
the presence of high levels of c or low levels of ; whereas increasing returns
to scale push e¢ ciency down to low levels even in the presence of low values
of c or high values of . This means that none of the two contracts is able
to warrant high e¢ ciency levels in the presence of valuable transactions.26 In
other words, when e¤ort is highly valuable, a centralized solution considerably
reduce the distortions occurring in private contracting due respectively to the
enforcement costs in E and the asymmetric information in NE. Even if these
distortions (i.e., enforcement costs and/or asymmetric information) may appear
relatively small, they can severely undermine the transaction because of their
negative impact on the optimal e¤ort.
5.1 One-shot game
Proposition 2 has proved the existence of the equilibrium in NE if  > ,
and uniquely E otherwise. Accordingly, the maximum welfare function of the
one-shot game (OS) under scrutiny, WOS , is simply
WOS =
WNE if  > 
WE if   
First, we know that the choice between E and NE does not depend on
. This implies that for each couple of values (; c) the e¢ ciency levels are
evaluated for the entire interval of  either in E or in NE, depending on the
choice made in the OS setting.
26This result evokes what inferred from the previous section.
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Lemma 4 If NE is chosen in equilibrium (i.e.,  > ) then WOS  WE,
whereas if E is chosen in equilibrium (i.e.,   ) then there exist ^ = (c)
and ^ = (; c) > 0 such that WOS < WNE for  > ^ and   ^.
Proof. This Lemma depends on the fact that principals choose on the basis of
their returns and not on the basis of welfare maximization. While UEP = WE ,
the same is not true for NE, where UNEP < WNE 8(; ). Thus, if  >  then
UNEP > U
E
P = WE , this trivially implies that WOS  WE . If    then there
is a region of (; ; c) such that WNE > WE if (1 + c) >

2 
2 
 2 

. Since
the right-hand side of the last inequality is lower than one, increasing in , and
lim!0

2 
2 
 2 

= e1 , there exists ^ = (c) =  productlog[  1(1+c)e ] such
that 8 > ^ there exists ^ = (; c) such that 8  ^ WNE > WE =WOS .
This Lemma implies that if a non-enforceable contract is chosen, the conse-
quent maximum social surplus arising in the one-shot model is always not lower
than the social surplus accruing from applying exclusively enforceable contracts.
In other words, by introducing in the contractual choice informal agreements,
and if these agreements are actually chosen, they may improve overall welfare,
and consequently social e¢ ciency. On the contrary, enforceable contracts in a
one-shot game are detrimental to e¢ ciency for a level of fairness beyond a cer-
tain threshold and especially for low-value transactions. In these circumstances,
a non-enforceable contract would be welfare-improving, but it is not eventually
chosen.
The overall e¢ ciency level of the OS setting is
OS =
1Z
=0
1Z
c=0
2Z
=0
WOS
WFB
 100 = 70:27%.
This is a striking result because it shows that widening contractual choice
over transactions improves social e¢ ciency, and we are also able to measure
the improvement, which is about 10 percentage points with respect to each of
the two contracts taken separately.27 Nonetheless, the one-shot game wastes on
average slightly less than 30% of social surplus.
Once again, we now try to understand the e¢ ciency loss by isolating the
role of , , and c. Let start analyzing the OS for specic values of  and c,
evaluated in the entire range of , as shown in Table 3.
27To our knowledge, this is the rst time that contract choice widening is evaluated in terms
of its social e¢ ciency.
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0:1 0:5 0:9
0:1 80.4 80.4 80.4
c 0:5 57.8 57.8 91.0
0:9 49.0 49.0 91.0
Table 3. E¢ ciency levels (%) in one-shot games 8.
Table 3 can be considered a composition of the two tables in Table 1. Indeed,
for specic levels of  and c chosen as reference points, NE can be chosen for
 = 0:9 and c = f0:5; 0:9g, and E otherwise. From the table we can infer that
e¢ ciency noticeably drops for medium/large values of c and medium/low values
of , as Lemma 4 warned. In general, these results simply predict that a one-shot
game tends to be more e¢ cient as c decreases and/or  increases. Especially,
the adoption of NE due to widespread fairness, and the consequential reduction
in asymmetric information, tends to considerably improve e¢ ciency levels.
In Table 3 we have described OSj;c; we now want to specify in Table 4
some reference values for  to nd OSj;c; .

case  = 0:1 case  = 1 case  = 1:9
0:1 0:5 0:9 0:1 0:5 0:9 0:1 0:5 0:9
0:1 99.50 99.50 99.50 90.91 90.91 90.91 16.35 16.35 16.35
c 0:5 97.89 97.89 99.97 66.67 66.67 99.00 0.05 0.05 39.17
0:9 96.68 96.68 99.97 52.63 52.63 99.00 0.001 0.001 39.17
Table 4. Punctual e¢ ciency levels (%) of one-shot games equilibria for =f0:1;1:0;1:9g.
For decreasing returns to scale, e¢ ciency is particularly high and close to
100% for any combination of (; c). For constant returns to scale, e¢ ciency is
still high and larger than 90% only for either low levels of c or high levels of
, and signicantly decreases otherwise. Finally, for increasing returns to scale
e¢ ciency collapses very close to 0, unless c is very small and/or  is very large;
which, however, only allows for e¢ ciency levels below 50%.
As already mentioned, players choose according to their own utility func-
tions, which may be at odds with the social welfare function. This yields the
result that even if  does not play any role for the existence of the equilibrium in
NE in the one-shot game, it does play a crucial role in measuring how e¢ cient
an equilibrium is. Regardless of the contract chosen in one-shot games, both
contracts su¤er severely from e¢ ciency losses for increasing returns to scale,
especially when returns to scale are highly increasing. Thus, if very valuable
transactions arise sporadically, without the chance to acquire reputation, that
is in a one-shot fashion, then a centralized solution may be desirable in order
not to waste social surplus.
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5.2 Repeated game
Once we move to a dynamic setting, such as the repeated game with nite pe-
riods, we want to understand how strategic reputation impacts on e¢ ciency.
We can actually appreciate a certain increase in the e¢ ciency levels, obtained
through the implementation of FB in a variable number of periods in some
regions of the surface (; ; c). The overall e¢ ciency level of the multiple equi-
libria in the space (   c) in repeated games, RG, is described by the ratio
of its welfare function (WRG) and the welfare function of the equilibrium in
which parties would trade in FB in every period (WFB):28
RG =
1Z
=0
1Z
c=0
2Z
=0
WRG
WFB
 100 =
8<: 70:71% if T = 1071:86% if T = 100
72:98% if T = 1000
9=;
The simulation shows that as T increases, e¢ ciency increases accordingly.
We have shown that for a given triple (; ; c) as  > , an increase in T brings
about a relatively larger number of FB with respect to NE, thereby increasing
the average social surplus, and consequently the e¢ ciency levels of the repeated
game setting. However, as we may notice, apparently the increase in e¢ ciency
does not seem very sensitive to an increase in T : interactions must get very
large in order to achieve an increase in e¢ ciency levels for the entire setting of
about 2 percentage points.
Getting into more details, as done in the previous tables, we will show in
Table 5 the e¢ ciency levels of this setting for the entire range of  and in Table 6
the punctual e¢ ciency levels, by evaluating e¢ ciency also as T increases. Note
that, apart from  = 0:9 and c = f0:5; 0:9g where non-enforceable contracts are
applied, the e¢ ciency levels in repeated games are the same as in the one-shot
game.

0:9
0:1 0:5 T=10 T=100 T=1000
0:1 80.4 80.4 80.4 80.4 80.4
c 0:5 57.8 57.8 92.3 94.5 96.4
0:9 49.0 49.0 92.4 94.5 96.4
Table 5. E¢ ciency levels (%) in repeated games 8.
28WRG is calculated by assuming the NE maximizing principals utility; therefore, WRG
corresponds to the maximum social welfare achievable when NE is chosen in one or more
periods.
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0:9
0:1 0:5 T=10 T=100 T=1000
0:1 99.50 99.50 99.50 99.50 99.50
case  = 0:1 c 0:5 97.89 97.89 99.997 99.9997 100
0:9 96.68 96.68 99.997 99.9997 100
0:1 90.91 90.91 90.91 90.91 90.91
case  = 1 c 0:5 66.67 66.67 99.90 99.99 99.999
0:9 52.63 52.63 99.90 99.99 99.999
0:1 16.35 16.35 16.35 16.35 16.35
case  = 1:9 c 0:5 0.05 0.05 39.17 39.17 92.52
0:9 0.001 0.001 39.17 39.17 92.58
Table 6. Punctual e¢ ciency levels (%) of repeated games equilibria for =f0:1;1:0;1:9g.
From the above tables we can now better understand where the improve-
ments of RG with respect to OS come from. The ine¢ ciencies of high-powered
technologies in one-shot games both without and with contractual choice can
be considerably reduced by reputation in a repeated setting. Indeed, important
e¢ ciency gains can be appreciated when informal agreements are clinched (i.e.,
 = 0:9 and c = f0:5; 0:9g) and reputation in rst-best becomes e¤ective (i.e.,
high T ) for very valuable transactions (i.e.,  = 1:9). In all other circumstances,
gains from more numerous interactions are trivial. Consider the following triple
( = 0:9;  = 1:9; c = 0:5): the di¤erence in e¢ ciency levels between T = 1; 000
and T = 100 is substantial. However, with the same triple there is no di¤erence
between T = 10 and T = 100, meaning that the number of interactions are not
enough to implement equilibria with some FB during the rst interactions, and
only NE can be implemented leaving the same e¢ ciency levels regardless of T
below a certain threshold. This means that, only beyond a certain number of
interactions, acquiring reputation in rst-best becomes viable for S because it
turns acceptable as riskless for the agent. In other words, good reputation can
be acquired and granted only if T exceeds a certain threshold, yielding e¢ ciency
gains compensating the waste of e¢ ciency characterizing the one-shot game and
its second-best equilibrium. If T is not high enough, reputation does not play
any role.
Thus, a policy-maker should set all possible conditions to make reputation an
available option through repeated interactions when the underlying contract in-
cludes valuable transactions. While we move to an unfair environment, repeated
interactions cannot release their e¢ ciency gains because enforceable contracts
will be implemented, so that acquiring reputation has no relevance.
6 Conclusion
We have provided a simple model examining the choice between enforceable
and non-enforceable contracts when, on the one hand, drafting enforceable con-
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tracts is costly and, on the other hand, fullling a non-enforceable contract is
left to partiesfairness. We nd that the choice between enforceable and non-
enforceable contracts in equilibrium depends on two variables: the enforcement
costs and the fairness level. Results hold in both a one-shot game and in a nitely
repeated game, independently on the number of interactions, meaning that rep-
utation does not a¤ect the choice on the type of contract to be implemented.
A third variable, which we refer to as the value-enhancing technology adopted,
and reecting the return to scale of the agents e¤ort, does not inuence the
choice between enforceable and non-enforceable contracts in equilibrium, but is
crucial in terms of e¢ ciency.
In general, contracts are fully e¢ cient if enforceable at no cost or if they
consist of gentlemens agreements between fair parties. If none of these con-
ditions hold, then every contract can only assure a second-best outcome and
consequently su¤ers from loss of e¢ ciency. The crucial question is how far from
the rst-best the equilibrium outcome is. Through mathematical simulations
and graphical representations we have been able to answer to this question by
evaluating accurately the e¢ ciency levels of all equilibria as a percentage of the
rst-best solution achievable by a centralized choice.
First, we nd that as the two contracts are taken separately, in other words
with no regard to the choice about which one to apply, both severely su¤er
from e¢ ciency losses in valuable transactions. Second, while we give the chance
to individuals to choose which of the two contracts to implement if they face
each other only once, that is with no regard to reputation, overall e¢ ciency im-
proves of about 10 percentage points, and it is particularly noticeable that social
welfare tends to be higher when non-enforceable contracts are implemented in
equilibrium due to a widespread fairness. However, also one-shot games severely
su¤er from e¢ ciency losses for increasing returns to scale, especially when re-
turns to scale are highly increasing. This would suggest that in sporadic and
valuable transactions, enforcement costs and asymmetric information over in-
dividualsfairness should be considerably reduced in order to capture maximal
social surpluses. Third, reputation through repeated interactions would help
further to improve overall e¢ ciency. The improvement is primarily achieved in
the region of increasing returns to scale, in which reputation granted by wide-
spread fairness and longer interactions reduce the e¢ ciency losses experienced
in one-shot games, but only for a very large number of interactions. Indeed,
only beyond a certain threshold, the number of interactions makes reputation
working. Thus, when principals cannot credibly acquire reputation, repeated
interactions cannot release their e¢ ciency gains because only second-best con-
tracts can reasonably be implemented. In the last circumstance, policy makers
should focus their action towards a reduction in enforcement costs or, otherwise,
by spreading fair-mindedness.
In sum, the impact of both the enforcement costs and the fairness level
on e¢ ciency is crucially conditioned by technology. Regardless of the contract
chosen and for every combination of  and c, low-powered technologies sustain
e¤ort levels and allow for e¢ ciency levels in equilibrium that are very close to
the rst-best solution, thereby making fairness almost irrelevant. Whereas high-
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powered technologies cannot exploit rst-best e¤ort levels and push e¢ ciency
down to very low levels which could be contrasted only by high levels of fairness
- becoming now relevant - coupled with long-term reputation.
These results may re-open an old debate referring to whether a centralized
public solution has to be preferred to free exchange in order to maximize social
welfare. The generally accepted solution of public intervention suggests that
the social planner should intervene when private contracting can not assure an
e¢ cient outcome. In our model, this is particularly the case in the presence of
increasing returns to scale. We can conclude that, independently on enforcement
costs and fairness levels, low-rate technology transactions should be left to par-
ties freedom, whereas high-rate technology transactions should be regulated.
Reputation can overcome regulatory practices only for long-term interactions
and with an already widespread trustworthy contractual environment due to
signicant levels of fairness.
The model we present can be subject to further development. For example,
di¤erent types of agents could be introduced if e¤ort were not freely observable.
Besides, we have considered two types of principals: fair vs. selsh. A possible
extension could allow for a continuum of individual types, taking into account
the degree of fairness, so as to evaluate how crucial the role of fairness and its
intensity are on contractual choice and e¢ ciency levels. Finally, the psycholog-
ical impact can be modelled so as to capture the extent of fair behavior, which
may be considered limited in monetary terms, describing a sort of limitation to
human generosity.
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